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 It is possible to speak about “naturalism” in many different ways – perhaps as 
many as the ways in which nature has been conceived by philosophy and 
common sense over the centuries. Nowadays, the theme of philosophical 
naturalism – as well as the connected issue of how far the naturalization of the 
controversial entities can go – is back at the center of the philosophical debate, 
particularly in the wake of the big success achieved by cognitive sciences. 
In this light, the first issue one should deal with is how exactly the concept 
of “naturalism” should be meant. Among the different forms of naturalism 
that are at stake nowadays in the philosophical debate, two are the most 
relevant. These are scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism; they are 
respectively connected to two very different research programs. The main 
differences between these two forms of naturalism lie in their different 
ontological, epistemological and methodological conceptions. From the 
ontological point of view, the first kind of naturalism relies on the ontology of 
natural sciences as the benchmark of what there is, whereas the second kind 
accepts a wider ontology – which includes evaluative, modal, 
phenomenological, intentional and abstract entities –, which only requires the 
compatibility (but not the reducibility) of those entities to the entities 
accepted by the natural sciences. From the methodological point of view, 
scientific naturalism requires the continuity between science and philosophy, 
whereas liberal naturalism does not. From the epistemological point of view, 
while scientific naturalism claims that in principle every case of genuine 
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knowledge is reducible to scientific knowledge, liberal naturalism is not 
committed to this view, and it may also accept other forms of knowledge (such 
as a priori knowledge or intuition), as long as they are not incompatible with 
the scientific view of the world. 
In this volume, the discussion concerns both general metaphilosophical 
issues (what are, in general, the prerogatives of naturalism? Which is the best 
version of philosophical naturalism?) and the viability of several projects of 
naturalization in different domains of philosophical research. Francesco 
Ferretti discusses the issue of whether the development of human language is a 
natural phenomenon, i.e. if it is a phenomenon explainable in evolutionary 
terms. In this light, he advocates the hypothesis according to which brain and 
language developed together. On the background  of a framework in which 
writing is both a means to record and to communicate, so that thought itself is 
outlined as a form of writing, Maurizio Ferraris defends a conception of 
language seen as a non-biological invention, as one of the constitutive elements 
of the so-called “second nature”. Paolo Tripodi discusses whether Wittgenstein 
should be considered a naturalist philosopher. He argues that we should give a 
positive answer to this question, if the term “naturalism” is also meant to 
cover a liberal view that sees our “natural history” (in a broad sense that 
covers both biology and culture) as natural. Alfredo Paternoster discusses 
which are the mental phenomena that can be naturalized. Against the received 
view on the matter, he defends the possibility of naturalizing the qualitative 
states but not the intentional states. Nicla Vassallo defends a feminist 
naturalized epistemology of a non-normative kind (i.e. an epistemology that 
does not explain how we should know, but rather how it happens that we 
know) that takes into account the biological and cultural factors of sex and 
gender, and asks how such a conception could stay on the same level of a 
reliabilist conception of knowledge. Finally, Mario De Caro and Alberto 
Voltolini outline the criteria of a good explanatory theory – namely a theory 
that is explanatorily adequate with respect to its data – and conclude that 
only liberal naturalism, but not scientific naturalism, can meet these criteria. 
 
 
